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The study utilises four Demographic and Health Surveys (DHSS) conducted in 1988, 1994,
1999, and 2005 in Zimbabwe to examine the socioeconomic differentials in fertility over
time. The period fertility (age-specific and total fertility) rates, cohort-period fertility rates
(CPFRs), projected parity progression ratios (projected PPRs), and logistic regression
methods are used in the analysis, overall, to assess the nature of fertility transition.
All the measures of fertility indicate an ongoing fertility decline in Zimbabwe among
all parities and age groups mainly as a result of an increase in modern contraceptive uptake.
Overall, fertility decline has been much more rapidly in the in the 1980 decade and slowed
since 1990. The analysis shows an inverse association between urban residence, education
and economic status, measured by ownership of household assets, and fertility based on the
total fertility (TFR), CPFRs and projected PPRs estimates. Further analysis of the net
effects of economic status and education using multivariate logistic regressions suggests the
odds of having a child (not having a child) decreases (increases) with economic status and
education. Overall, even after controlling for various socioeconomic variables fertility
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Substantial effort has been made in investigating the socioeconomic factors underlying
fertility change across several African countries at the micro- and macro-level (Cohen,
1993; Kirk and Fillet, 1998; Agadjanian and Praia, 2002; Kravdal, 2002; Rutstein, 2002), but
studies which investigates the socioeconomic fertility differentials overtime/across periods
within countries are rare. Macro-level refers to differences at the national level by level of
development/modernisation whereas micro-level refers to differences between women in
different socioeconomic groups. This study focuses on the micro-level where individual
decisions on fertility are made and advance on the micro-level effects of socioeconomic
status on fertility in Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe is amongst the first African countries to have begun fertility transition.
Mhloyi (1992) estimates that fertility decline began in the late 1960s, following the
introduction of a segmented family planning in 1953 among blacks (Kaler, 1998) and due to
war (Muhwava and Timaus, 1996) leading to delayed or postponement of births. The post-
independent period is characterised by a baby boom and a period of stability with sustained
fall in fertility as a result of huge investments in health and education, active family
planning to the whole population, amongst other factors (Muhwava and Timaus , 1996;
Guilkey and Jayne, 1997). Although fertility transition is underway in Zimbabwe, recent
evidence indicates that fertility decline has slowed down or possibly stalled probably due to
the recent economic and political crisis (Bongaarts, 2008).
As with the experience of several African countries in the 1970s which were affected
by economic crises (National Academy of Sciences, 1993), economic conditions in
Zimbabwe in recent years have also deteriorated markedly (Cooney, Clausen, Funke a al.,
2007). It is not yet known, however, how socioeconomic differences in fertility (or desired
fertility) vary across the periods of economic development and deterioration in Zimbabwe.
At a national level, few studies on fertility differentials have been done. The ones which
exist, for example Zanamwe (1988) and Mazur and Mhloyi (1994) were carried out a long











recent 2005 Zimbabwe Demographic Health Surveys (ZDHS) to examine differentials in
actual fertility and fertility preferences by socioeconomic status from 1988 to 2005.
The body of knowledge on fertility has a common conclusion that indicates all effects
on fertility outcomes must operate through one or a set of proximate determinants, such as
contraception, postpartum infecundability and marriage (van de Kaa, 1996; Kirk and Fillet,
1998; National Academy of Sciences, 2004). Thus the relationship between socioeconomic
status and fertility is not direct but acts through proximate determinants, but the direction
of the impact of socioeconomic status in the fertility determination process can either be
positive or negative.
1.2 Statement of the problem
The level of fertility differs by socioeconomic status. There is always the need to
understand why fertility differs within population subgroups exposed to different or the
same socioeconomic environment. It is much less clear to what extent the sudden and
recent economic setbacks may have influenced, or are associated with, fertility outcomes,
since fertility adjustments to such causes are not immediate, universal or consistent. These
adjustments grin use of contraceptives, entry into marriage, and timing of births, amongst
others) in turn may be influenced by socioeconomic differentials. Hence planners should
take into account these fertility differences among subgroups of the population in order to
determine the path for fertility decline in Zimbabwe.
1.3 Objectives and significance of the study
The study has two specific objectives. First is to quantify and analyse socioeconomic
(urban-rural residence, and education) differentials in fertility over time by using period
fertility (i.e., age-specific and total fertility) rates, cohort-period fertility rates and projected
parity progression ratios. Fertility differentials by economic status, a DHS index measure of
wealth, are measured by period fertility rates. Second, in addition to these demographic
techniques, a multivariate statistical procedure is employed in order to broaden the
understanding of the effects of socioeconomic status on fertility while controlling for the
effects of other variables. The hypothesis of the study is that economic status, education











For development planning, governments and policy makers need data on the
socioeconomic characteristics of the population, and any changes that may take place in
future. Research has shown that socioeconomic factors such as education, urbanisation and
economic status are associated with the values, practices, and behaviour towards fertility
outcomes or preferences (Cohen, 1993; van de Kaa, 1996; Skirbekk, 2008). In sub-Saharan
Africa, the concern of governments which have adopted family planning services is that
fertility is still high and lags behind that of developed countries despite the effort to reduce
high population growth. In addition, in Zimbabwe the rate at which fertility is declining has
slowed down in recent years and due to this delayed fertility transition there is a need to
know which particular population subgroups arc influencing the direction of fertility
change or have high levels of fertility and possibly to determine the future course of
fertility. In developing countries, poor socioeconomic conditions in general and among
women are thought to influence fertility behaviour. It is important, therefore, to examine
fertility transition in its socioeconomic context rather than to generalise across countries or
the region, in order to forecast or predict fertility and fertility preferences.
1.4 Organisation of the dissertation
This study is made up of six chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the literature related to the study.
Chapter 3 describes the data, outlines the methods used for analyses to answer the research
objectives and presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study, and
comparisons from the different data sources are done to check for consistency. Chapter 4
further evaluates the data and discusses the possible link between fertility trends and
economic conditions. The methods that arc used to identify periodic shifts and patterns of
variations in fertility outcomes are also discussed. In Chapter 5, the logistic regression
results on differentials in fertility by socioeconomic status controlling for other factors are
presented, analysed and discussed. Chapter 6 gives an assessment of findings of the study,











CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the literature on fertility in the context of economic transition in
Zimbabwe. Section 2.2 and 2.3 discusses the theoretical frameworks, and determinants of
fertility change, respectively. Section 2.4 and 2.5 details the recent demographic history, and
economic history of Zimbabwe, respectively. The gap filled by this study is specified in
Section 2.6.
2.2 Theories of fertility decline or change
The demographic transition theory explains fertility decline in relation to socioeconomic
development or modernisation. Industrialisation and urbanisation are seen as the
preconditions to fertility decline. In Europe, modernisation improved living conditions, the
supply of food, sanitation and public health systems among other things, thereby reducing
mortality among children. Due to the increasing chances of survival among children the
need to have more children among couples phased away, and hence fertility declined (Kirk,
1996; van de Kaa, 1996). The demographic transition theory does not provide a functional
relationship between mortality and fertility which is consistent among countries, fails to
predict the timing of fertility decline, and does not explain why fertility may stop going
down. These shortcomings of the demographic transition theory as an explanation to
fertility transition in less developed countries has led to the search for alternative
explanations for fertility decline, which have been discussed broadly by Hirschman (1994)
and van de Kaa (1996).
The theories of fertility decline have been classified by van de Kaa into classical
narratives, biological/technological, economic, social and cultural categories. Most of these
theories are elaborations of the classical demographic transition theory which has been
explained earlier.
The most notable biological fertility narrative is the Davis and Blake framework
proposed in 1956. Davis and Blake (1956) posit that a woman must complete three stages











eleven proximate determinants (factors which directly affect or modify fertility) which fit
well into the three stages classified above. Other variables (background/socioeconomic
variables) influence fertility either positively or negatively through one or a set of the
proximate factors. However, the theory does not explain the origins of social and cultural
influences that constrain fertility in high fertility settings.
Social and cultural narratives such as Caldwell's wealth flows theory,
innovation/diffusion and ideational/cultural change (van de Kaa, 1996) have also not gone
unchallenged. According to Caldwell's theory of intergenerational wealth flows, fertility is
low as a result of economic benefits to children and high as a result of parents receiving
economic benefits from their children. Fertility will decline when parents cease to get
economic benefits from children, although the measurement and timing of wealth flows is
difficult to determine. The innovation and diffusion, and ideational and cultural change
arguments are rather similar in their interpretation. Fertility change is attributed to the
spread of information, perceptions, practices, birth control technology, social norms and
aspirations. The greater the diffusion the more likely is the anticipated fertility decline.
However, diffusion of birth control techniques such as the use of modern contraceptives
may not lead to fertility limitation especially in Africa where women highly regard
childbearing as a symbol of social standing, but rather contraceptives may be used as a
means of birth spacing (Hirschman, 1994; van de Kan, 1996) or even for postponing births
(Timaus and Moultrie, 2008). It remains a challenge to quantify the innovation and cultural
factors, such as norms and aspirations and it appears that they occur not in isolation with
economic factors.
The Easterlin model is one theory which illustrates that relationship, and according to
van de Kaa (1996:412), it combines the demand and supply factors "in one model to arrive
at a synthesis of the economics and sociology of fertility". The most acknowledged
economic theories of fertility change arc the new home economics theory and the Easterlin
framework. The proponents of the demand oriented (number of children desired) new
home economics theory, Becker in 1960 and Schultz in 1981 ascribes fertility decline to
couple's income, the utility of children compared to that of other status goods and relative
costs of children compared to other consumable goods. Based on their quality and quantity











having an additional child. With increasing income, parents would opt to invest more on a
particular child (quality of a child) rather than on many children (quantity of children).
Hence fertility drops when parents expect less utility and satisfaction from having an extra
child. The new home economics theory, however, neglects the supply side (actual number
of surviving children) which was incorporated by Easterlin in 1975 in his framework.
Easterlin incorporates tastes and preferences in determining fertility outcomes. He put in
the proximate  causes of fertility change as the demand for children, the supply of children
and the cost of fertility regulation in which socioeconomic, cultural, and biological factors
influence the total number of children ever born. The demand for children is influenced by
aspects of modernisation which includes the following; urbanisation, education, new goods,
family planning programs and medical care which either influence positively or negatively
the number of children ever born. The supply side depends on natural fertility and the
survival prospects of infants and children until they reach adulthood. The costs of fertility
regulation are both direct (time and money) and indirect (psychic) costs that concerns the
use of contraception. Fertility decline occurs when the supply side exceeds the demand
side. Further, actual fertility change depends on how the desire to limit fertility compares
with the cost of fertility regulation; the lower the cost of birth control the greater is the
motivation to limit fertility. Individuals and couples may delay childbearing and marriage if
standards of living deteriorate (I lirschman, 1994; van de Kaa, 1996).
In Europe fertility declines occurred during economic development whereas in Africa
it has been argued that a new type of fertility transition may be underway in several African
countries driven by problems associated with failure of structural adjustment programmes,
diseases (HIV/AIDS), political instability and shortage of economical and natural resources
such as employment and land. The crisis-led fertility decline 'transition' notion has
stimulated research among several scholars for African countries which have undergone
socioeconomic and political crisis such as Botswana, Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Angola, and
Eritrea, to mention a few (National Academy of Sciences, 1993; Lesthaeghe and Jolly, 1995;
Zaba and Gregson, 1998; Agadjanian and Praia, 2002; National Academy of Sciences, 2004;
Woldemicacl, 2008). According to Lesthaeghe and Jolly (1995), falling standards of living
due to crises may contribute to fertility decline since it would not be favourable to continue











increase in mortality, particularly due to HIV/AIDS and worsened job security amongst
others factors induce individuals to delay or postpone childbearing (or marriage). They
argue that prior to fertility decline as a consequence of increased costs of childrearing a rise
in fertility may occur as a result of reduced child spacing among women. The most
important feature of a crisis is that it causes uncertainty which may motivate women to
shape their reproductive decision and behaviour.
The manner in which crises may affect fertility and fertility decision making among
couples and individuals appears to be complex. The response of fertility to crisis depends
on the progression and duration of the crisis. Short-term effects of a crisis tend to be large
whereas long-term effects appear to be diverse since the fertility levels of the affected
populations might be similar to those of the not affected population as in the case of
Angola (National Academy of Sciences, 2004). Further, the effects of crisis on fertility
appear to depend on the affected population characteristics, the phase of fertility transition
and adverse consequences experienced, that is, shortage of food, unavailability of health
services, exposure to a number of socioeconomic hardships among other things (National
Academy of Sciences, 2004). Garenne and Joseph (2002) argue that limited opportunities
may stimulate a desire for a small family size or a postponement of marriage and births in
urban areas while in rural areas fertility may tend to rise at the same time. It appears that
women who are poor or living in rural areas may value children as a source of labour and
economic security for old age hence they tend to desire for more children in times of
economic crisis.
Given this background, three fertility trends may be observed during a crisis
according a woman's social status. First, an increase in marriage rates may have a positive
influence on fertility due to people turning back to earlier norms and practices which value
childbearing, that is, pronatalist attitudes. Second, entry into marriage may decline due to
economic shocks and greater external cultural influence such as "westernization" leading to
a reduction in fertility and third, no change might be expected during crisis period (and
post-crisis period) relative to the pre-crisis period, hence economic crisis may have little











2.3 Proximate determinants of fertility, and socioeconomic differentials in
fertility
The proximateate determinants of fertility provide a suitable framework by which
socioeconomic variables (such as education, place of residence, and economic status) can
be understood to influence the number of children ever bon) or fertility. The simplified and
quantifiable four proximate determinants from the Davis-Blake framework of eleven
factors are; age at marriage, postpartum infecundability, contraception and abortion
(Bongaarts, Frank and Lesthaeghe, 1984). Bongaarts, Frank and Lesthaeghe note that,
overall, an increase in abortion, age at marriage and use of contraceptives has a negative
effect on fertility whereas the shortening of postpartum infecundability has a positive effect
on fertility.
Marriage is a major determinant of fertility where pre-marital sex is rare or
discouraged (Woldemicael, 2008). However, it has been found in several Southern African
countries by Garrene and Joseph (2002) that non-marital unions may contribute
significantly to fertility outcomes as a result of increased premarital fertility, particularly if
contraceptive use is limited. Further, during economic hardships rather than choosing
marriage, couples or individuals may opt to cohabit to avoid the payment of bridewealth
(Philipov, 2002).
Infecundity, that is, the inability to procreate, may occur voluntarily due to
breastfeeding or involuntarily as a consequence of starvation or disease (National Academy
of Sciences, 2004). The extent and duration of breastfeeding might be short during
economic crisis relative to normal times as traditional breastfeeding practices might be
abandoned as a result of severe malnutrition, especially among the poor (Palloni, Hill and
Aguirre, 1996). If contraception is not used fertility may increase. In an earlier study in sub-
Saharan Africa, Bongaarts, Frank and Lesthaeghe (1984) note that gonorrhoea had a
significant negative effect on fertility and recent studies (Gregson, Zhuwau, Anderson et al,
1997; Zaba and Gregson, 1998; Gregson, Terceira, Kakowa d al, 2002; Lewis, Ronsmans,
Ezeh et al, 2004; Yeatman, 2007) have shown that HIV/AIDS has an influence on fertility.
Yeatman argues that HIV may influence positively or negatively the decision making about
childbearing through many pathways. The effects of HIV on fertility could be caused by











behaviour among infected women (Gregson, Zhuwau, Anderson et al, 1997; Zaba and
Gregson, 1998). primary premise is that the desire to have a child may be changed
when one knows his or her HIV status, although Zaba and Gregson observed that the
majority of people are unaware of their status. They argue that HIV , positive women have a
marked lower fertility than HIV negative women since their biological mechanisms might
be altered through infecundability. Similarly, Lewis, Ronsmans, Ezeh et al (2004) argue that
the death and illness of one's partner may lower fertility among HIV-infected  women.
Where excess infant mortality prevails, as a longer-term measure, HIV-infected
women are likely to have a risk insurance and replacement approach of having more
children and some women may even seek to have many children in a short span of time
before the progression of the disease. While, on the other hand, the fear of infecting the
child with the disease when giving birth or breastfeeding, deteriorating one's health through
further childbearing and that the child may be orphaned tend to reduce fertility and fertility
aspirations among infected women (Zaba and Gregson, 1998; Yeatman, 2007).
Lesthaeghe and Jolly (1995) note that contraceptive uptake in sub-Saharan Africa
accelerated during the periods of economic downturns as opposed to the experience of
Europe where fertility dropped during the periods of economic growth as a result of an
increase in birth control measures. As a result of economic hardships, individuals and
couples may control their family size by delaying or stopping childbearing through the use
of contraceptives and hence ultimately fertility declines. Conversely, Peracca (2002) states
that as a result of economic reversals, the use of contraceptives could be abandoned as a
result of either their increased cost or their unavailability and as a consequence fertility may
rise. Moreover, if the use of contraceptives is not widely accepted among women fertility
may not decline.
Abortion is illegal, and not well documented in Zimbabwe. Deteriorating living
standards may undermine the health and nutrition of pregnant women leading to an
increase in both induced (voluntary) and spontaneous (involuntar•) abortions, infecundity
and still births, hence a fertility decline (Palloni, Hill and Aguirre, 1996). In addition to
unreported spontaneous abortions, which occur as a result of famines or severe shortage of
food, their impact on fertility levels is of minimal effect (National Academy of Sciences,











induced abortion on fertility regulation has become a major concern due to unwanted
fertility which could be increasing as a consequence of economic difficulties individuals or
couples experience (Garenne and Joseph, 2002), and this has a negative implication for
fertility.
These proximate factors account for most of the variation in fertility among
populations and population subgroups, in particular contraceptive use and age at marriage
are common measures in comparative studies. Education and urban-residence,
unmistakably, among other socioeconomic factors have been widely incorporated in
differential fertility studies and to some extent as proxy measures of socioeconomic
status/economic status (Bollen, Glanville and Stecklov, 2002; Rutstein, 2002). According to
Bollen, Glanville and Stecklov, economic status which is a measure of inequality/social
ranking, has different meanings, measurements, and varies with context. Although not the
focus of this project, this study adopts their measurement and definition of economic status
based on wealth. Based on their empirical study using data from Peru and Ghana they
conclude that a better proxy for economic status is one based on ownership of selected
weighted consumer durable goods, usually constructed from the application of Principal
Components Analysis technique compared to other proxy measures such as occupation,
education, consumption, and sum or value of goods owned. This procedure has been
corroborated by Rutstein (2008) and Schoumaker (2004) who further proposed weights and
categories which can be used for comparative purposes when using DHS data.
Schoumaker (2004) argues that positive correlations between economic status and
fertility have occurred in some sub-Saharan countries or societies as a result of lower
fertility preferences, longer breastfeeding practices, frequent marital dissolutions due to
widowhood and divorces, higher foetal loss and sterility among the poor and very poor. On
the other hand, he notes that more often economic status is inversely related to fertility
because the poor tend to have an insurance strategy towards childbearing probably as a
result of regarding children as a means of old age support, their lower levels of education
and access to modern contraceptives amongst other factors. According to Skirbekk (2008),
the rich/elite have low fertility as a result of their individualism and higher levels of
education, income, aspirations, contraceptive use, and participation in labour force amongst











More educated women typically have fewer children than less educated women
regardless of economic circumstances as a result of their delayed entry into marriage and
participation in paid work which competes with childrearing (Cohen, 1993; Agadjanian and
Prata, 2002; Kravdal, 2002; Rutstein, 2002). With education, a woman's status may be
enhanced and her bargaining power in controlling family size may improve as a result of
new aspirations amongst other factors (Potts and Marks, 2001). In a study in sub-Saharan
Africa, Cohen (1993) find that women with a little education have higher fertility than
uneducated women. Cohen argues that small amounts of education may break down birth
spacing practices, reduce long breastfeeding intervals and postpartum abstinence, without
necessarily lowering fertility desires or  increasing the age at marriage. This finding is
corroborated by Rutstein (2002) for several sub-Saharan countries. In a comparative study
in Nepal between 2001 and 2006 fertility gaps between uneducated women and educated
women narrowed significantly, as a result of a large fertility decline among uneducated
women due to their increased use of contraceptives, increase in age at marriage and reduced
fertility aspirations (Karki and Radha, 2008). In addition, uneducated women tend to
imitate the fertility behaviour of the educated in their neighbourhood and therefore
behaviour can become more common, especially towards limiting fertility (Kravdal, 2002).
Urban residence, due to its dependency on the monetary economy, is associated with
lower fertility when compared to rural areas. Economic hardships in urban areas more
often have a negative effect on fertility (National Academy of Sciences, 1993; Eloundou-
Enyegue, Stokes and Cornwell, 2000). In addition, urban women tend to be more educated,
participate in employed work, and exposed to modern contraceptives than rural women
(Cohen 1993).
Haines (1989) suggests that the stage of fertility transition influences fertility
differentials. In a European-oriented study, he found that the early phases of fertility
transition are prone to widened fertility differentials whereas during the later stages of
fertility transition fertility differentials tend to converge, especially at replacement level
fertility (i.e., a total fertility rate of slightly more than 2 children per woman). Overall, in
early phases of fertility decline the middle and upper classes began their fertility transition
much more rapidly than the lower classes (Raines, 1989; Skirbekk, 2008). Whereas most











fertility transition much earlier than developing countries, in sub-Saharan region fertility
transition has been delayed and high fertility is still the norm. Caldwell and Caldwell (2002)
state that Southern Africa is targeted to have attained replacement level fertility in two
decades to come. Thus socioeconomic differences in fertility exist and there is need to
address fertility transition in Southern African countries towards a much more rapid fertility
decline in order to realise national fertility regulation policy targets.
2.4 Fertility decline in Zimbabwe
Muhwava and Timaeus (1996) estimate that fertility began to fall during the Civil War of
the 1970s, and after independence in 1980 there was a slight baby boom after which a
sustained fertility decline began in the mid-1980s and continued in the post 1990 era. Figure
2.1 and Table 2.1 show the trend in the total fertility rate (TFR) over time in Zimbabwe
estimated using direct and indirect techniques from various data sources; Census,
Zimbabwe Reproductive and Health Survey (ZRHS), Intercensal Demographic Survey










1980s and slowed after 1990. It is well documented that increase in contraceptive use is one
major determinant in reducing fertility in Zimbabwe (Mhloyi, 1992; Kravdal, 2002).
Although research on the causes of a fertility stall (slowing down of fertility decline) is still
a neglected area, Bongaarts (2008) posits that poor performing economies, rising mortality,
particularly due to HIV/AIDS, and weakening family planning program efforts to reduce
unwanted fertility could have caused fertility to stall in some sub-Saharan countries. Since
the late 1980s or the early 1990s mortality began to increase due to HIV/AIDS in
Zimbabwe (Gregson, Zhuwau, Anderson of al. 1997; Feeney, 2001; Tabutin and
Schoumaker, 2004). HIV prevalence is estimated to have risen from a little above 10 per
cent in 1990 to 24.6 per cent in 2003 and 20.1 per cent in 2005 (MOHCW , 2005;
UNAIDS, 2005). Terceira, Gregson, Zaba el al (2003) estimate that about a quarter of
fertility decline from the late 1980s to the late 1990s in Zimbabwe may be attributed to
HIV-relatedsub-fertility which results from increased amenorrhoea and marital
dissolutions amongst other factors. In addition, the possible effect of migration out of the
urban areas (both in terms of women with few children migrating, as well the reduction of
the numbers living in urban areas) could have led to stagnating fertility decline in
Zimbabwe.
The quality of survey and census data in Africa is rather poor (Cohen, 1993; Cleland,
1996) and to aggravate the problem the application of the estimation techniques on fertility
measurement is not consistent amongst researchers. Direct and indirect estimates from the











different estimates from the same data set, as can be seen in Table 2.1. Using the P/F ratios
method, Mhloyi (1992), Thomas and Muvandi (1994), and Muhwava and Timaeus (1996)
estimated the total fertility rate for the same year using the 1984 ZRHS to be 74, 7.1 and
6.4 children per woman, respectively and these results differ from the estimate of 6.2
obtained from the Relational Gompertz model by Muhwava and Timaeus. In addition,
Blanc and Rutstein (1994) and Thomas and Muvandi (1994) differ on whether or not the
data from the 1984 ZRHS and 1988 ZDHS surveys are comparable or capture the same
population subgroups. Thomas and Muvandi are of the view that survey methodology
between the two surveys are different and hence acceleration of fertility decline in the
period was overstated whereas Blanc and Rutstein are of the opposite opinion, and argue
that the procedure Thomas and Muvandi used is inappropriate and hence the magnitude of
fertility decline between the two surveys does not need any adjustment. Thus, comparative
fertility differentials studies within and across countries may not be dependable if different
measures or methods are not carefully applied to data.
2.5 Economic history, causes and consequences
This section gives background information on economic change in Zimbabwe in the post-
independence era, in order to place the current study in context.
The 1980 decade has been described by Brett (2005) as a period when structuralist
policies were implemented in Zimbabwe, which saw the state and the political authorities
exercising extensive influence on the market, leading to a centralised economy. Heavily
subsidised education and primary health care services were introduced and expanded to
rural areas. Towards the late 1980s most social indicators had improved and poverty,
especially among rural dwellers, had been reduced (Alwang, Mills and Taruvinga, 2002).
After 1990, a trade liberalisation of the economy was implemented to enable free
market competition. However the economic reforms which were launched in Zimbabwe,
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991, Zimbabwe Programme for
Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) in 1998 amongst others, failed to meet
or realise their targets or objectives. The failure to implement these economic reforms is
mainly attributed by Brett (2005) to the government's inefficiency or failure to deal with the











resources to mention a few. During the 1990s due to an onset of economic decline some
key social indicators which had improved in the previous decade started to deteriorate,
thereby worsening inequality and poverty among people. Poverty and inequality increased
among households in the mid 1990s due to increased job losses. Aggravating the bad
economic conditions were droughts, floods, global fall in commodity prices and the
HIV/AIDS epidemic (Alwang, Mills and Taruvinga, 2002; UNDP , 2004; Brett, 2005).
Brett (2005:4) mentions that "counter-productive political decisions were taken from
1997" such as the chaotic land resettlement which undermined commercial agricultural
production, and the financing of military activities in Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) by the political authorities among other factors. The political instability and bad
economic policies exacerbated the deterioration of the economy and inequality among
individuals (Economic Commission for Africa, 2002; Coorey, Clausen, Funke d al., 2007;
Magaramombe, 2007).
Since 1999 the country has experienced a politically-driven deep economic crisis. A
hyper-inflationary environment, corruption, price distortions and regulations, minimal
development aid, increase in external debt, shortage of foreign currency reserves, recurring
droughts, deteriorating standards of living and a loss of investments, amongst other factors,
contributed to the crumbling of the economy (Economic Commission for Africa, 2002;
UNDP, 2004; Coorey, Clausen, Bunke et al., 2007).
Figure 2.2 shows trends in the macroeconomic (annual GDP per capita, GDP growth
and inflation) indicators in Zimbabwe over the period 1980-2005. Overall, the period 1980-
1990 may be described as a decade of social and economic development where inflation
was relatively stable and the gross domestic product (GDP), a measure of economic
wellbeing, was rising, particularly after 1982. The post 1990 era marks the onset of
economic decline in the early to mid 1990s and the acute crisis period in the late 1990s and
into the recent years. Figure 2.2 shows that the GDP per capita has declined continuously












The literature reveals that fertility (or fertility differentials) may be influenced by, or
correlated with, the socioeconomic setting and/or the stage of fertility transition in a given
population. Most differential fertility studies within countries look at periods of either
socioeconomic growth or deterioration/crises, however, studies which examine how
fertility differentials vary with socioeconomic changes arc rare. Zimbabwe provides a
setting where economic upturns and downturns have occurred in succession since the post-
independence era and fertility transition is clearly ongoing although recently overall fertility
has slowed down. It is less clear whether the socioeconomic fertility differentials varies with
time, that is, whether the differences in fertility (or fertility preferences) among
socioeconomic subgroups are narrowing or have remained the same over time in
Zimbabwe and if childbearing decisions have been influenced by socioeconomic changes.
In addition, since fertility differentials by economic status as measured by wealth, have not
been explored in Zimbabwe, less is known about the nature of fertility differentials











surveys to construct socioeconomic fertility differentials over time using methods
highlighted in the next chapter.
There are several reasons why socioeconomic differentials in fertility exists, although
this study briefly summarised them, it is most important to note that research into fertility
differentials by economic status is less common. For comparative purposes; survey data are
becoming more available and standardised within countries, and methods of measurement











CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS
3.1 Introduction
The objectives of this chapter are two-fold: first, to describe the data sources and variables
used in the study and second, to assess the data quality using descriptive statistics to
understand the distribution of the data used in the study.
3.2 Data sources and quality
In developing countries, Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have become the gold
standard for the analysis of birth histories, which are essential for the detailed analysis of
trends and determinants of fertility (Cleland, 1996; Garenne and Joseph, 2002; Schoumaker
and Hayford, 2004). The Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (ZDHS) data for
1988, 1994, 1999, and 2005 obtained from the Measure DHS on line database
(www.measuredhs.com /) are used in the analysis. The principle of collecting data and
sampling procedure is essentially the same for all the ZDHS surveys hence they can be used
for comparative purposes. Data were collected through the use of individual and household
level questionnaires. Household questionnaires are used to gather information on all
household members including background characteristics, household size, household
characteristics, and ownership of consumer goods. The individual questionnaire was used
to collect information on women's birth or reproductive history, fertility preferences,
contraceptive use and knowledge, and women's work.
The DI IS surveys are conducted using a two-stage sampling procedure. The DHS
surveys use an individual weight variable to adjust for sample design errors and non-
response (Croft, 2007). At the first stage of sample selection, Enumeration Areas (EAs)
were stratified by region of residence, which consists of ten provinces and urban-rural
residence. The EAs were chosen with a probability proportionate to size. At the second
stage, households in each EA were randomly selected. All women aged 15-49 within the
households were eligible to be interviewed. A total sample of 4,201, 6,128, 5,907 and 8,907
women aged 15-49 from the 1988, 1994, 1999, and 2005 surveys, respectively, were











Over the years, the sample size increased with each succeeding survey and therefore the
confidence interval surrounding the estimates obtained from these data should improve or
increase with time.
Birth history data from DHS surveys can be used to provide a full account of births
that occurred among women aged 15-49 at the time of the survey. The data collected in the
DHS surveys, however, are affected by selection effects and recall bias. Selection effects
arise due to the fact that women with more children (or with short birth intervals)
contribute more to fertility and hence they are over represented in the analysis. Recall bias
results from the omission of recent births or displacements of births from the time they
actually occurred (National Academy of Sciences, 1993; Cleland, 1996). However, Cleland
(1996) argues that the quality of birth history data from DHS surveys has improved over
the years since the questionnaires are highly standardised and designed to minimise errors.
The DHS surveys collect current status information since they are designed to be cost
effective. Hence this creates a current status variable problem in the study of fertility since
some events are collected at the time of the survey instead of when they actually occurred.
This is particularly a problem for older cohorts of women who might have changed
residence at the time of the survey. Hence the current status of a woman's residence may
not truly reflect her residence at the time she actually had her children. Employment status
is also another current status variable which applies at the time of the survey hence the
variable may not reflect the woman's working status at periods before the survey when a
woman really had her birth. To minimise the current status variable problems, the period
analysis of births events has been restricted to the last five years before the survey, rather
than looking at lifetime events in statistical models.
3.3 Description and construction of variables
Table 3.1 shows the list of key variables included in the study and their distribution in the
data sets to check for consistency. These include; age, age at first marriage and birth, marital
status, place and region of residence, education, number of living children, employment
status, knowledge and current use of modern contraceptives. Economic status is another





















This section describes how the variables used in the study are standardised (or recoded) in
each DHS for Zimbabwe to facilitate comparisons across the surveys.
3.3.1 Age
Age is measured in five year age groups from age 15 to 49 which is conventionally treated
as a woman's reproductive life span. The variable captures cohort effects for older women
versus younger women in terms of actual fertility behaviour and fertility intentions. Figure
3.1 shows that, overall, there is consistency in the distribution of age across all the ZDHS
surveys. In the 1988, 1994, 1999 and 2005 ZDHS surveys fewer women aged 20-24, 25-29,











Plotting the individual birth cohorts of women aged 15-49 for each survey show a
consistent drop in the number of women born around 1967 (Figure 3.2). This sudden dip
in the late 1960s might have been caused by the emergence of war "Second Chimurenga"
and partly due to economic hardships among the majority of people since the country was
under economic sanctions. A delay or postponement of births could have occurred as both












Both the mean age at first birth and marriage have increased over the years, albeit
marginally. The mean has the disadvantaged that it can be distorted by outliers', that is, by
higher ages which tend to inflate the mean and/or smaller ages which may deflate the
mean. A better measure would be the median which is not affected by outliers. The median
age at first birth and marriage have remained the same over time at age 19 and 18,
respectively (data are not shown). The age at first marriage has not been included in
regression models because it is highly correlated with age at first birth. The age at first birth
marks the beginning of exposure to the risk of childbearing. For the purpose of the
statistical modelling exercise, it has been divided into five segments; '<15', '15-17', '18-19',
'20-24' and '25+'. The category /<15' is included to capture women who have had their
first birth before attaining age 15. In recent years, the timing of age at first birth and age at
marriage appears not to have been influenced markedly by the changes in societal and
economic conditions, even when the data are disaggregated by age group (data not shown).
This suggests a tendency for early childbearing among women, regardless of the time
period or changes in socioeconomic conditions.
3.3.2 Marital status
The DHS defines marriage as including cohabitation, hence marital status has three levels;











over time of this variable indicates that generally there is some stability in unions in the
country, although in 2005 there was a slight decrease in the proportion of currently married
women. The rise in formerly married women is associated with an increase in widowhood
gable 3.1), since divorce has changed only marginally over the period. This increase in
widowhood, among women aged 15-49 might be indicative of the spread of HIV, since
estimated prevalence increased from about 4 per cent to 22 per cent among women aged
15-49 between 1988 and 2005 (MOHCW, 2005).
3.3.3 Place of residence
Place of residence is used to assess the differences in fertility dynamics between the urban
and rural populations. Overall, urban areas have been receiving areas while rural areas have
been sending areas over the whole study period, since the proportion of urbanised women
increased from 33.5 per cent to 39.3 per cent between 1988 and 2005. The majority of
people live in rural areas (Table 3.1).
3.3.4 Region of residence
Region of residence is a categorical variable with ten provinces in which two provinces;
Bulawayo and Harare  are the major urban cities in the country. The variable has been
included in the analysis to capture some socio-cultural  variation since no information was
collected on ethnicity for the 1999 and 2005 surveys. The division of provinces in
1979/1980 was done considering the ethnic background of people; therefore the study
assumes that this distribution has not changed much except in the two major cities. Overall,
during the 1988-2005 Mashonaland central, Masvingo, Matebeleland north and Harare were
the receiving areas while the rest were sending areas.
3.3.5 Education
Education is a categorical variable with three segments; `no education', 'primary',
`secondary or higher education'. In this study, the secondary and higher educated segments
are combined due to small numbers of the higher educated women. Between 1988 and
2005 the proportion of women with no education and primary education decreased











same period. The data are consistent with literacy rates which also increased over the years
as a result of the government's commitment to expansion of education.
3.3.6 Employment status
Woman's working status is an indicator of labour market participation. The dummy
variable has been coded '1' for working and '0' for not working. Overall, the proportion of
women participating in the labour force increased between 1988 and 1999. Between 1999
and 2005 the proportion of women employed decreased by a quarter. The decline is
associated with the period of severe economic crises, which have contributed to an increase
in unemployment as a result of economic recession amongst other factors.
3.3.7 Number of living children
In statistical models, the variable has five levels; '0' for no living child; '1' for one living
child, '2' for two living children, '3' for three living children and `4-l' for four or more living
children among all women aged 15-49 and four levels which excludes the '0' category
among all women who have begun childbearing. The proportion of women with four or
more children has decreased over time (Table 3.1).
3.3.8 Knowledge and current use of contraceptives
Knowledge and current use of contraceptives variables are proxy measures for availability
or access to family planning services. Due to the fewer cases of the folk and traditional
methods responses, the variables were renamed as knowledge and current use of modern
contraceptives and recoded `no' for no method, folk and traditional methods and `yes' for
modern methods. Knowledge of contraceptives is very high and consistent in all the
surveys, and this may have contributed to a 43.5 per cent increase in uptake of modern
contraceptives between 1988 and 2005 from 27.2 per cent to 39.1 per cent (Table 3.1).
3.3.9 Economic status
The economic status variable is constructed as a index from ownership of selected
consumer durables and housing quality/characteristics as proposed by Schoumaker (2004).
In a comparative study for sub-Saharan countries, Schoumaker developed the wealth index











The items and weights estimated using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) technique are
shown in Table 3.2. The same variables and weights proposed by Schoumaker were
adopted in the analysis of the four ZDHS survey data.
The wealth index was computed using a series of dichotomous variables which arc
weighted giving a value of '1' in each case to an individual who has a radio, television,
refrigerator, motorcycle, car, piped water, finished floor and a flushing toilet, and '0'
otherwise. Each of the eight binary variables in Table 3.2 for each ZDHS data is multiplied
by its' corresponding weight and the product of the eight variables is summed to generate
economic status/wealth index. The index range for economic status vary from 0 to 146
with five categories indicating 0 for poorest, 0.01-0.32 for very poor, 0.33-0.79 for poor,
0.80-113 for middle 'richer', and 2.14-3.46 for better off 'richest' as classified by
Schoumaker (2004) . Schoumaker posits that these categories act as a basis for comparison
across and within countries.
The distribution of economic status over time is shown in Error! Reference source
not found.. According to Rutstein (2008), this variable is useful in the analysis of DRS data
as corroborated by Bollen, Glanville and Stecklov (2002), and it is intended to measure the
influence of inequalities of economic hardships on the timing of birth events and fertility
intentions. Although economic status is measured at the time of the survey, the variable is











ownership of stable features of the household which are usually not changed in the short
term.
The data for the distribution of economic status indicate that the richer and richest
have the greatest chance of living in urban areas whereas the poorest, very poor and poor
have the greatest probability of living in rural areas in all the surveys. The poorest are likely
to be uneducated, the very poor are likely to have primary education, and the richer and
richest are likely to have secondary or higher education. This finding is consistent in all the
surveys. The distribution of the poor appears somewhat the same across the levels of
economic status in all the years except in 1999 where women with secondary or higher
education are much fewer than those with no education and primary education. Even if
there are some changes, it appears there is not a consistent trend or pattern on how the
women's economic status has changed over time. The mean scores for economic status for
the 1988 and 1994 surveys are very different and smaller from the scores in the 1999 and
2005 surveys, which are almost the same.
3.4 Derivation of dependent variables
In order to examine how fertility could have changed according to economic status, two
dependent variables presented in Table 3.4 are used: fertility preferences (or desired
fertility), and occurrence of a birth in the past five years immediately before the survey. The
study examines how fertility preferences change over time: "whether or not a woman
intends to space/delay childbearing", and "whether or not a woman intends to limit











yes while a negative answer or those who were undecided were coded '0' for no. Only a
small proportion of respondents gave an uncertain response, and women who were
sterilised or declared infecund were excluded in the analysis of fertility desires. The
occurrence of a live birth during the previous five years was coded '0' for a negative
response and '1' for a positive response. It has been observed that the birth occurrence
indicator (having a birth in the period considered) is a good measure of fertility (or
reproductive choice) in DHS surveys (Agadjanian, Dommaraju  and Glick, 2007). A detailed










from 53.6 per cent has occurred between 1988 and 2005, implying a tendency to delay or
limit childbearing among women. This can be confirmed also by the fact that the
proportion of women desiring to limit childbearing increased by almost by a third from
32.7 per cent to 42.3 per cent, while the proportion of those who want another child soon
(within 2 years) decreased to 10.3 per cent from 17 per cent in the same period. These
descriptive statistics indicate that the crisis period (1999-2005) is associated with a higher
propensity for women to limit or delay childbearing.
The timing of births by age of the mother shown in panel (a) in Figure 3.3 indicates
an increase from 1988 to 2005 in the proportion of women who had not given birth in the
last five years before each survey. Figure 3.3 shows that most births in last year before each
of the surveys in panel (b) and two years before each of the surveys in panel (c) occurred
among women age 20-24, except in 1988 where a large proportion of women aged 25-29
had children in the last two years of the survey. The results show that the timing of births
in the immediate two years before the surveys has changed between the pre-1990 era and
the post-1990 era. The 1988 survey indicates a higher proportion of women had given birth
in the past two years before the survey at all ages, except age group 1519 as compared to










trends and the quality of fertility data in the surveys in detail, a method known as cohort-
period fertility rates originally developed by Hobcraft, Goldman and Chidambaram (1982)
described in the next chapter has been used. In addition, fertility differentials according to
level of education, place of residence and economic status are assessed over time using
period fertility rates (i.e., age-specific and total fertility rates). To control for selection
effects a paired-comparison procedure, Projected Parity Progression Ratios (Pj), proposed
by Brass and Juarez (1983) is described in Chapter 4. Since sample composition changes
over time, a multivariate analysis procedure set out in Chapter 5 improves the
understanding of fertility trends according to women's economic status while controlling
for the variation caused by other variables. The methods outlined above are described in











CHAPTER 4: FERTILITY TRANSITION IN ZIMBABWE
4.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to examine fertility dynamics in Zimbabwe over time and to
assess the quality of birth history data using various demographic techniques. Fertility
levels, trends and differentials are presented. The changes in total fertility rate (TFR), age-
specific fertility rates (ASFRs), cohort-period fertility rates (CPFRs) and projected parity
progression ratios (Pjs) arc also discussed.
4.2 Period fertility
In this section, the age-specific and total fertility rates are presented based on a 3-year
exposure period to assess the nature of changes that have taken place in fertility over time.
The syntax used in this study for computing the rates from DHS data is described on the
Measure DHS website (www.measuredhs.com ). The trends in total fertility rates for
national estimates and by age, economic status, educational level and place of residence are
shown in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.2 presents age-specific fertility rates for the country as a
whole and according to rural-urban residence and educational levels. Figure 4.3 shows the
age-specific fertility rates by economic status. The data for these figures are presented in
Tables 4.14.2. The DHS surveys take some months to complete, hence for accurate
reporting the mean date of interview may be taken as the reference date for the survey. The
accurate reference date for the 1988, 1994, 1999 and 2005 ZDHS surveys are 1988.93 (3/4-
November-1988), 1994.76 (4/5-September-1994), 1999.81 (21/22-September-1999) and
2005.89 (19/20-October-2005), respectively. Since 3-year fertility rates are being examined,
the estimates apply to the year centred about one and half years before the survey on
average, and therefore the period fertility rates refer to the years centred on 1987.43,







































4.2.1 National fertility rates
Examining the changes in the fertility rates from 1987 to 2004 indicates that fertility has
fallen in Zimbabwe from 5.4 children per woman to 3.8 children per woman over the
period. Fertility dropped by 20.6 per cent, 7.7 per cent and 4 per cent between 1987-1993,
1993-1998 and 1998-2004, respectively (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1). Overall, in all the surveys
most births have occurred among women aged 20-24. In addition, the median age at
marriage among all women remain at 18 years in each survey and no change in age at
marriage over time.
The pace of fertility decline was highest between 1987 and 1993 and lowest dining
the economic crisis from 1998 to 2004 (Figure 4.1). Research attributes fertility decline in
Zimbabwe to high use of contraceptives and lengthening of birth intervals (Muhwava and
Timaus, 1996; Moultrie, 2005). This study finds that the use of contraceptives among all
women increased from 27.2 per cent to 39.1 per cent between the 1988 and 2005 surveys.
The least relative percentage increase in contraceptive use of 9.8 per cent occurred between
1998 and 2004 (i.e., from 35.6 per cent to 39.1 per cent) during economic crisis (Table 3.2).
Hence, the economic crisis might be associated with the apparent stall in fertility since
contraceptives uptake increased slowly among all women. However, Figure 4.2 suggests
that there is no evidence that the recent severe socioeconomic crisis depressed fertility since
the national age-specific fertility schedules are similar for the 1999 and 2005 surveys. More
data using the next ZDHS would shed light on the effect of the crisis on fertility. The
stalling of fertility decline in the recent period could be as a result of separation of partners
due to an increase in divorce, widowhood (Table 3.1) and possibly as women with children
emigrate.
Among women in union, the current use of modem contraceptives is generally higher
than the prevalence that is shown among all women in Table 3.1. Contraceptive prevalence
among women aged 15-49 in union at the time of the survey increased from 36.1 per cent
in the 1988 survey, to 42.2, 50.4 and 58.4 per cent in the 1994, 1999, and 2005 surveys,
respectively (data are not shown).
4.2.2 Fertility by residence
The total fertility rates estimated from the four ZDHS surveys indicate that urban women











1987 and 1993 especially among rural women (Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2). Table 4.1 shows
that fertility decreased from 3.8 to 2.6 and 6.2 to 4.6 children per woman in urban and rural
areas, respectively. Since place of residence is a current status variable caution should be
taken in interpreting the results due to possible migration between urban and rural areas.
This may overestimate fertility in the receiving area while underestimating fertility in the
sending area.
Figure 4.4 shows the rural-urban differentials in current use of modern contraceptives
among women in union at the time of the survey. Since 1987 modern contraceptive uptake
increased rapidly in both urban and rural areas, and urban women have a higher propensity
to use modem contraceptives than rural women. There is a propensity for fertility to
decline with increase in contraceptive use. I fence an explanation for low urban fertility
could be that there is higher modern contraceptive use among urban women and a higher
age of entry into first marriage and of giving a first birth compared to rural women.
Overall, the age at marriage in Zimbabwe is low in both rural and urban areas, but higher in
urban areas than rural areas by an age difference of one year.
4.2.3 Fertility by education
All the surveys show that fertility is inversely related to the level of education (Figure 4.1











change their fertility behaviour than the educated women since their fertility was higher and
changed sharply over time. Between 1987 and 1993, the greatest fertility decline occurred
among uneducated women. Relative to the 1998 estimates, in 2004 fertility increased by
10.5 per cent from 5.2 children per woman among uneducated women, while for primary-
and secondary or higher-educated women fertility dropped. Overall, uneducated women
have a lower age at marriage than educated women, hence longer exposure to risk of
childbearing. In addition, in Zimbabwe, the use of modern contraceptives is high and has
increased over time among educated women and this could have a negative effect on
fertility. In general, modern contraceptive prevalence increases with the level of education
in each survey (Figure 4.5). The proportion of uneducated women using modern
contraceptives between 1999 and 2004 dropped and this could have contributed to the
slow change and increase in fertility in the same period among the uneducated women
(Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.5).
4.2.4 Fertility by economic status
Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2 show that there is a negative association between economic status
as defined in section 3.3 and fertility in each survey. Fertility is highest among the poorest
and lowest among the richest. From 1987 to 2004 fertility among the poorest is more than











economic status are related to those by education since there is a propensity for the poor to
have lower levels of education whereas the well off are more likely to be better educated.
Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of economic status by modern contraceptive use at
the time of the survey. Across all the levels of economic status modern contraceptive use
has increased over time and there is a positive correlation of contraceptive use with
economic status. Between 1987 and 2004 modern contraceptive use increased substantially
among the poorer/low-economic status women (first the poorest, then the very poor, and
poor by relative per cent of 102.3, 71.3, and 72 from 24, 31.6 and 35.5 per cent,
respectively) than among the rich/high-economic status women (richer and richest where
contraceptive use increased by relative per cent of 45.7 and 19.2 from 43.9 and 58.6 per
cent, respectively). Overall, the age at marriage between the low-economic status and high-
economic status women differ by one year and among all the levels of economic slams
there is not much variation in age at marriage between 1987 and 2004. The age at first birth
is highest among the rich and lowest among the poorest.
Overall, the high-economic status women are more likely to use modern
contraceptives, and be married and give birth at a later age than the low-economic status
women. Tentatively, it can be concluded that economic status has a positive relationship










It appears there is a contradiction in the results obtained in the 2005 survey. Figure
4.5 shows modem contraceptive prevalence has decreased relative to the 1999 survey
among the uneducated whereas Figure 4.6 indicates that modern contraceptive uptake has
increased among the poorest in the same period. This suggests that the economic status
variable captures probably more information on women than the education variable. Some
women who are poorest are better educated hence an overall increase in contraceptive use
over time. Further, Table 3.1 shows that the proportion of uneducated women has
decreased markedly over time and is lowest in the 2005 survey. Thus the proportion of
uneducated women not using contraceptives could have been oversampled in the 2005
survey and this might be as a result of random fluctuation due to small sample size.
Both the age-specific and total fertility rates are period measures that do not permit an
assessment of the fertility experience of a real cohort of women, hence cohort-period
fertility rates may shed some light on the dynamics of fertility changes. Further, period rates
might be distorted by shifts in the timing of fertility and thus may be unreliable for










In panel C the CPFRs in Panel B are rotated to reflect age at end of period rather than
survey date so that columns present period comparisons by age, rows present age
comparisons by age and diagonals present cohort rates. Panel D presents the cumulated
cohort fertility at the end of period (P) obtained by summing the diagonals for each cohort
and five year durations before the survey in panel C and multiplying the result by five. To
obtain cumulated fertility within periods (F) in panel E for each cohort the columns in
panel C are summed and multiplied by five. The last panel, F, shows the P/F ratios
obtained by dividing the rates in panel D by the rates in panel E (Goldman and Hobcraft,
1982; Moultrie and Timaeus , 2002).
In this study, Panels A to F are shown in Table 4.3 only as an illustration of all the
calculations done while for the rest of the tabulation of CPFRs , only Panels C to F are
presented. Also, the national estimates are presented in the main document while the
estimates by place of residence and education subgroups are tabulated in Appendix A. The
calculated fertility estimates may be taken as applying to the year centred on mid-points of
the respective intervals before the survey, that is, for 2.5 for 0-4 years before the survey, 7.5
for 5-9 years before the survey and so on up to 32.5 years before the survey.
4.4 Evaluating the data and estimating fertility trends
An examination of the quality of data using the CPFRs and P/F ratios highlight errors of
omission, and/or displacement of births. The displacement errors are also known as Brass
and Potter effects (Potter, 1977). Brass effects are characterised by a tendency for older
women to displace the dates of birth further back in the past than when they actually
occurred. This results in an overestimate of the level of fertility in the most recent periods
preceding the survey, and hence the appearance of a declining fertility for recent younger
cohorts would be incorrect. Potter effects are caused by the displacement of births closer to
the survey date, but the recent births are reported correctly. This result in an
underenumeration of the level of fertility for the periods' further back in time, and heaping
of births in the intermediate periods (Potter, 1977). The CPFRs provides a tool for
highlighting errors and inconsistencies between data sets.
The shaded parts in the Panel C in Table 4.3-4.6 and Table A1-A20 tin Appendix A)
for national estimates, and differential estimates by residence and education, respectively











common pattern of some possible heaping of births in the intermediate periods, that is,
Potter effects some 10-14 or 15-19 years before the 1988, 1994, 1999 and 2005 surveys.
Omission of births in the earliest periods (i.e., more than 20 years before the survey) may
be observed for the older cohorts of women in all the surveys when the data are
disaggregated by urban-rural residence and education. The omission of births further back
in time among women may underestimate the level of fertility. In the 1988 and 2005
surveys some evidence of displacement of births towards the survey date may be seen
among both urban-rural women, and among women with primary education and no
education in the most recent periods before the survey in the 0-9 years before the
survey). Displacement of births toward the survey date among uneducated women aged 25-
29 some 5-9 years may be observed in the 1988 and 2005 surveys (Table A3 and A18).
To estimate the total fertility rate in the 5-9 years before the survey it may be
assumed that the age-specific rates for women aged 45-49 in the 5-9 years before the survey
(bold font in Panel C in Table 4.3-4.6 and Table Al-A20) is the same as for the adjacent
cohort in the 0-4 years prior the survey. This implies fertility has been constant for that age
group in the period. Then the cumulated fertility within periods (total fertility rate) for the
5-9 years before the women aged 45-49 in the 5-9 years before the survey (bold font in
Panel E in Table 4.3-4.6 and Table A1-A20) is obtained as mentioned in section 4.3. The
assumption made is not a significant impact on the total fertility rate since fertility among
women aged 45-49 is low. Figure 3.3 supports the assumption made for women aged 45-49
since the proportion giving birth in this age group in all the surveys is very small. Thus
from each survey two estimates of fertility may be obtained for the years centred some 2.5
years and 7.5 years before the survey. For instance, from the 1988 survey, Panel E in Table
4.3 shows a total fertility rate of 5.6 and 6.7 children per woman 2.5 and 7.5 years before
the survey, respectively. That is, between 1981 and 1986 fertility dropped by one birth per
woman, which is a rapid decline in a short span of time. From all the surveys fertility
estimates, trends and differentials by urban-rural residence and education can be obtained.






































The CPFRs in Panel C for the most recent period can be standardised across data sets
to give a non-conventional schedule of age-specific fertility rates for the five years before
the survey shifting from older to younger ages. The shape of the national age distribution
has not changed rapidly over time (Figure 4.7). Fertility seems to have declined at older age
groups and become increasingly concentrated at younger age groups over time. This is
consistent with previous fmdings using the 3-year exposure age-specific fertility rates
(Figure 4.2). To assess how fertility has changed over a period of time can be done by
reading from right side to the left in Panel C or Panel E across the rows. When the P/F
ratios are close to one in all age groups fertility is constant and when they are monotonically











when the divergence between cohort and period fertility is larger. That is, when a strong
upward trend in P/F ratios is observed in the most recent time periods and they are not
clearly visible in earlier time periods. However, a deviation from one points to an
approximate time when fertility started to drop (Potter, 1977; Goldman and Hobcraft,
1982; Hobcraft, Goldman and Chidambaram, 1982; Moultrie and Timaus, 2002).
Examining the P/F ratios in Panel F along the diagonals among older women
suggests some evidence of age misreporting. Underreporting of births is confirmed by P/F
ratios which deviate from the trend in the adjacent cohorts, for an easy illustration they
have been shaded in the tabulations (Tables 4.3-4.6). For example, underreporting of
parities is confirmed by looking at the diagonals of the cohort of older women aged 35-49
in Panel F which deviates from the trend in the adjacent cohorts (Table 4.5). As indicated
for national estimates some evidence of age misstatement and misreporting of births
among older women may be observed also by looking at the P/F ratios according to rural-
urban residence and education (Appendix A). This indicates omission of births especially
among the oldest women has occurred in the earliest time periods. This distortion appears
to have been worst among women with no education perhaps due to recall error bias.
Cohen (1993:11) argues that omission of births are difficult to correct, however their effect











The estimates of total fertility rates in Panel E for the CPFRs (in Table 4.3-4.6 and
Table A1-A20) apply to the years centred on the midpoints of the 0-4, and 5-9 years before
the survey, that is, 2.5 and 7.5 years before the survey, respectively. Hence from each survey
two estimates of fertility rate are obtained to get fertility trends plotted in Figure 4.8.
The two time references for each survey are: 1981.43 and 1986.43; 1987.26 and
1992.26; 1992.31 and 1997.31 and 1998.39 and 2003.39 for the 1988, 1994, 1999 and 2005
surveys, respectively. Thus two estimates of fertility rates with close reference points
between two consecutive surveys in Figure 4.8 should closely match. Overall, the fertility
estimates from the four surveys are dependable and a slight variation in the estimates is
observed especially for the national, urban, primary education and secondary or higher
education categories compared to the rural and no education categories. The fertility
estimates which apply to the 2.5 years before each survey are consistent with those
obtained from period fertility rates (in Table 4.1). The fertility rate estimates which apply to
the 7.5 years before each survey are slightly higher than the consequent estimate in the
following survey. This suggests that the assumption made earlier that fertility is constant in
the five years before the survey for women aged 45-49 is not perfect when fertility declines











obtained in each survey in Figure 4.8, an overall fertility trend over time can be fitted or
observed for each population subgroup to get an overall picture of fertility decline in
Zimbabwe.
Overall, as indicated previously the pace of fertility decline was rapid before 1990 and
slow after 1990. The rapid decline in fertility occurred among uneducated and primary-
educated women prior to 1990. In the same period, although urban fertility is lower than
that in rural the speed of decline was almost the same since fertility decline in the two areas
is parallel (Figure 4.8). The greatest decline in fertility decline occurred in periods where
economic conditions were good compared to the period of economy decline. The findings
here are consistent with those obtained from the period fertility rates. However the cohort
approach reveals that the fertility differentials by education are narrowing over time.
The CPFRs may give a very approximate summary of the timing of the onset of rapid
fertility transition (decline) tabulated in Table 4.7. "Date of onset of the fertility transition,
... is the date at which cumulated fertility at age 40 started to decline in a consistent way"
(Garenne and Joseph, 2002:1837). In this study, the P/F ratios (derived as a ratio of
cumulative fertility of cohorts at end of period, P, to cumulative fertility within periods, F,
as defined earlier) are used to date when fertility started to decline in a sustained way in
Zimbabwe using the four ZDHS survey data. As mentioned before, deviations of P/F
ratios from 1 allow one to identify the approximate time period in which fertility started to
decline. To date the onset of sustained rapid fertility decline the average date of two periods
in which the P/F ratios are very close to one (fertility unchanging) and P/F ratios are
increasing by age cohort (fertility decline) were taken. The approach gives an approximate
reference time for the onset of rapid fertility decline. By first looking at the ratios for
national estimates, the 1988 survey indicates that fertility started to decline about 0-4 years











Fertility started to decline rapidly around 1984 when the mid-points of the periods are
taken for the country as a whole (Table 4.7). The estimates of the time when fertility started
to decline rapidly arc observed to be consistent whether using the 1994, 1999 and 2005
ZDHS data, especially when deriving the national average. The estimates derived from the
four data sets for residence (urban/rural) do vary quite widely due to random fluctuations,
therefore caution should he exercised in interpreting the results. This inconsistency may be
due to the urban-rural current status variable problem as a result of migration as mentioned
earlier and probably due to underreporting of births among older women. The pace of
fertility decline started to accelerate about 2.5, 7.5, 12.5 and 17.5 years before the 1988,
1994, 1999 and 2005 survey, respectively since the P/F ratios markedly increase deviating
from one (Table 4.3-4.6).
The CPFRs give an overall picture of fertility decline which could have started to
accelerate in the early 1980s, for the country as a whole and first among urban women and
later among rural women as indicated by the 1988 survey. In a study in sub-Saharan Africa,
Garrene and Joseph (2002) investigated fertility trends in Zimbabwe by fitting a polynomial
on the 1988 and 1994 ZDHS data and observed that fertility began to fall in urban areas as
early in 1970 and followed later in rural areas in 1984. Although Garenne and Joseph used a
different approach to the CPFRs procedure applied in this study, their estimates on onset
of fertility decline in Zimbabwe,1984 for rural and 1970 for urban, vary modestly (and
widely) from those obtained in this study using multiple data sets (Table 4.7). Besides the











fluctuations, displacement of births and static descriptions of urban-rural current status
variable problem which could not controlled for using the CPFRs technique.
4.5 Projected parity progression ratios (Pj)
As opposed to the preceding sections which did not examine the pattem of fertility decline
with respect to parities, this section investigates how women have progressed from one
parity to a subsequent one over time in Zimbabwe. The proportion of women with a given
number of children who progress to have another child is known as the parity progression
ratio (PPM. Parity progression ratios have a disadvantage that they do not address
selectivity effects which arises because some women who are more fertile than others are
overrepresented in the experience reported. In addition they cannot be used when fertility
is not yet complete, which is especially the case among younger cohorts. To deal with
selection effects on birth histories, Brass and Juarez (1983) proposed the projected parity
progression ratios (Pj) technique, where j represents parity. This is a method to measure
women's propensity to limit family size and provides estimates of the projected completed
family size among cohorts of women by the end of their reproductive life span. Hence
changing patterns of family formation process may be examined.
The approach requires two tabulations of data first; parity by age group of the mother
at the time of the survey (i.e., the untruncated data), and parity, one excluding births in last
five years before the survey, by age group of mother at the time of the survey (i.e., the
truncated data). Defining n j as the number of women of parity h the PPR from parity j to
j+1 is thus denoted by a j , where al =nj+1/nj  (Hinde, 1998). In separate tabulations for
both the untruncated and truncated data, the PPRs are computed for each parity and
cohort. Then the indices of relative change are derived as the ratio of equivalently
untruncated and truncated data of each cohort of women and parity (i.e., for each parity;
the ratio of younger cohorts (from the untruncated data) to older cohorts (from the
truncated data)). The indices of relative change assess the change in fertility at equivalent
parities and ages between two different cohorts. The implied assumption stated by Brass
and Juarez (1983:6) is that "the ratio of values with equivalent censoring is the same as the
ratio of corresponding values without censoring". That is, relative fertility between cohorts
will van- in the same way in the future as in the past. Hence selection bias is reduced by











truncated five years ago has fallen compared to the older cohort, and vice versa (Moultrie
and Timaeus , 2002).
The indices may be used to derive projected parity progression ratios using an
iterative procedure. The Pj for cohort of women aged 45-49 is by definition the PPR for
that cohort. Then the Pjs for all other cohorts in reverse order from the 45-49 cohort may
be obtained by the product of the previous Pj for the older cohort and index of relative
change for the cohort (Moultrie and Timuus, 2002).
Brass and Juarez (1983) and Moultrie and Timuus(2002) find that the Pj method give
estimates consistent with the alternative method, truncated pairwise measures of parity
progression (Bt) which measures the proportion of women who progress to have another
birth within t months of an index child. The Pj technique is not affected by timing of births
events as the total fertility rate hence it is a better indicator of the level of fertility in the
family building process (Brass and Juarez, 1983).
Figure 4.9 presents the national estimates of indices of projected parity progression
ratios for the 1988, 1994, 1999 and 2005 ZDHS surveys with the x-axis as the birth cohorts
of women aged 15-49 arranged from oldest to youngest to get a time trend. The data for
this figure are presented in Table B1 (in Appendix B). A series of Pjs can be chained
together for each parity progression and each survey to obtain parity progression patterns
and assess the reliability of fertility data since the surveys overlap (Muhwava and Timaeus,
1996; Moultrie and Timaeus , 2002).
The 1988, 1994, 1999 and 2005 surveys were conducted approximately 5-6 years apart
hence some age group cohorts overlap each other. The mid-points of the birth cohort
intervals were plotted for each survey. The Pjs values less than 65 per cent are not graphed
in the analysis because it is inaccurate to project these small Pjs since most women have not
experienced that parity progression while those between 65 and 80 per cent should be
treated with caution as suggested by Moultrie and Timaeus (2002). A horizontal line for the
Pjs suggests no evidence of fertility decline while a point of inflection and a downward
slope may be a rust sign that fertility might be falling. The Pjs among all women (national
estimates) are presented in Figure 4.9 based on the four surveys. Figure B1-B2 (in
Appendix B) presents the Pj to the fourth parity according to residence and educational











of education and categories of urban-rural residence become inevitable, hence the fifth
parity onwards are not presented.
Figure 4.9 shows that the estimated Pjs up to the fourth birth order are near one in
the 1988 survey. This suggests a high fertility reproductive environment and no significant
drop in fertility due to control of family size reflected in the 1988 survey up to parity four.
Table B1 (in Appendix B) for the 1988 survey shows that from the fifth birth onwards the
Pjs tend to fall from the largest age cohort to the cohort of women born around 1953. It
may be observed that the quantum of fertility started to fall as a result of a drop in high
birth orders among younger women aged less than forty at the time of survey.
The 1994 survey shows some evidence of fertility decline among younger women at
all parities while among older women fertility has remained quite high. This decline among
all parities is apparent and continues in the 1999 and 2005 surveys, respectively with the
exception that in the 2005 survey the Pjs at second birth seems not to be falling. A marked
decline in the Pjs at third and higher births appears to be due to a strong family size control
among all age cohorts of women in recent years. Overall, the proportion of women
progressing to higher parities has been falling over time, which indicates that the level of
fertility has also been falling.
It is important to note that there is consistency and close coincidence in data points
for all the parity progressions in all the surveys, which imply an overall good quality of birth
history data despite of some omission of births which have been found earlier using
CPFRs, and hence the method used is robust. It may be observed that the method is not
affected by the timing of birth events in the family formation process. Further, when the
Pjs are plotted according to urban-rural residence, regardless of the current status variable
problem mentioned earlier, the data points are close to each other (Figure B1), and the
same pattern can be observed by examining Pjs according to the level of education (Figure
132).
Figure 4.9 suggests that fertility began to fall for the cohort of women born around
the mid-1960s for the country as a whole. The dates knit together with estimates obtained
from cohort-period fertility rates in the previous chapter that fertility dropped in early
1980s. Again, examining data points from the 2005 survey indicates the proportions of
women progressing to higher order parities (4th or above) have decreased markedly over











second birth (and higher parities for women aged 40-49) was almost universal in all the
surveys. The drop in fertility at higher parities may be seen to have been more recent and
among younger women at those parities. Figure B1-82 reflects that fertility decline
occurred earlier among better educated women and urban women compared to uneducated
and rural women.
Overall, the estimates obtained from Pis are similar to those obtained by Garrene and
Joseph (2002) and Muhwava and Timaeus (1996) and corroborate those obtained from
CPFRs (Table 4.7). Early signs of fertility decline may be seen among women born around
1960 and 1965 for urban women and rural women, respectively. Allowing about 15-19
years for exposure to start childbearing, fertility began to decline in the late 1970s and early











that fertility started to fall among women born around 1960 (second parity), 1965 (third
parity), and 1970 (fourth parity) among women with secondary or higher, primary and no
education, respectively.
4.6 Completed fertility
The projected parity progression ratios may be used to estimate the mean parities of each
cohort of women by the end of their reproductive life span. Table 4.8 presents the average
completed family sizes by cohort, place of residence, education and the country as a whole
from the 1988, 1994, 1999 and 2005 DHS surveys. With exception of the 2005 survey, the
surveys are approximately on average 5 years apart, hence a cohort of women can be
followed from one survey to the next survey. For instance, women aged 35-39 in the 1988
survey would be aged 40-44 on average in the 1994 survey and 40-44 in the 1999 survey as
illustrated in bold in Table 4.8. Caution should be exercised in interpreting the results since
the surveys are not perfectly equally spaced and that urban-rural residence is a current
status variable and education is a time-varying variable. By the age of 30 a woman would
have completed her schooling and more often committed in marriage which might not
allow her to migrate or change her place of residence frequently. The results are expected
to be reliable, since older cohorts of women being examined more often do not change










Tracing the cohort of women aged 35-39 for the country as a whole from the 1988
survey to the 1999 survey, as illustrated by the diagonal in bold in Table 4.8, suggests that
by the end of their reproductive period the average number of children they would have
had have increased, albeit marginally from 5.8 to 6.2 children in a decade. The cohort of
women aged 45-49 in Table 4.8 represents the estimates of projected TFR, and when
compared with the period TFR in Table 4.1 the projected TFR is generally higher than the
period TFR which implies fertility is declining with time as corroborated with earlier
findings. Overall, the results in Table 4.8 suggests that younger cohorts of women desire
small family sizes compared to the older cohorts of women over time.
Table 4.8 shows, as expected in each survey and cohort, that urban women (or more
educated women) can be expected to have had a lower number of births than rural women
(and less educated and uneducated women). Tentatively, among women aged 35-39, 40-44,
and 45-49 in both urban and rural residence, the later is the survey the lower is the
projected completed fertility of women in each cohort by the end of their reproductive life
span.
4.6 Discussion
The chapter has summarised the fertility levels and trends in Zimbabwe by cohorts, and
parities. The estimated fertility rates obtained from a combination of direct and indirect
methods used in the analysis are consistent and have been used to summarise the
magnitude and nature of fertility decline mainly by urban-rural residence and educational
level. On the whole the study utilise the data from the four ZDHS surveys to allow for
comparison of fmdings over time. All fertility measures which have been applied to the
data suggest that fertility has declined in the post-independence era since the early 1980s.
The steepest decline in fertility has occurred in periods where economic conditions were
good (before 1990) compared to the periods of economy decline (after 1990). An ongoing
fertility decline among all parities and cohorts has been observed in all the surveys. In
addition, an interesting pattern in family formation has occurred among uneducated and
poorest women which appear to have increased their fertility in recent years. 'Ibis might
have slowed the overall pace of fertility decline in the same period (Figure 4.1). This
contrasts with other findings where researchers observe an overall short-term decline in the











Enyegue, Stokes and Cornwell, 2000; Woldemicael, 2008). This may be explained partly by
Eloundou-Enyegue, Stokes and Cornwell and Woldemicael's use of single calendar year
estimates which fluctuates rapidly compared the three year exposure fertility rates used in
this study, which are reasonably stable. However, the arguments with regard to crisis may
not be conclusive since fertility decline may have occurred as a result of other independent
factors such as diffusion of contraception and ideational factors which have an important
role in influencing fertility as argued by Hirschman (1994). Further, improvements in
education among women (Table 3.2) may have shifted tastes for childbearing by reducing
the demand for children (Karki and Radha, 2008), between 2001 and 2006 in Zimbabwe. In
a study in Nepal, Karki and Radha (2008) find in their study period that the differences in
fertility by education narrowed significantly as a result of large fertility declines among the
uneducated women due to improved contraceptive use. This is consistent with this study's
findings, although a significant fertility decline has occurred over a longer period of time
between 1980 and 2005 in Zimbabwe (Figure 4.8) and indeed as a result of an
improvement in contraceptive use (Figure 45) as supported by other studies Mhloyi (1992)
and Kravdal (2002). In addition, the possible effect of migration out of the urban areas to
rural areas and out of the country could also explain fertility decline in Zimbabwe. Fertility
differentials by economic status have been examined using period total fertility rate and the











CHAPTER 5: LOGISTIC REGRESSION
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter provides an assessment of fertility trends in Zimbabwe using total
fertility rate, projected parity progression ratios, age-specific and cohort-period fertility
rates. However, such techniques do not control for the effects of other reproductive factors
on family size. A multivariate approach is employed to identify any periodic changes or
shifts in fertility to corroborate the results obtained in the previous chapter. It is conducted
to examine how fertility has been influenced by economic status and to compare how the
coefficients vary over time, that is, from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period.
5.2 Logistic regression
Logistic regression is a statistical procedure that involves analysing data with a binary
response variable, in other words it involves modelling the relationship between
independent variables (covariates) and a binary response variable. A logistic modelling
approach has the advantage that the model assumptions are less stringent It makes no
assumption about the distribution of the independent variables. Further, a multivariate
approach enables a test for the impact of a covariate (or set of covariates) on the response
variable while controlling for all other covariates in the model (or other effects) (DeMaris,
1992).
Since the response variables mentioned in Chapter 3, (having a birth in the last five
years before the survey and desire to limit childbearing) are binary their relationship with









The results from logistic regression are presented as odds ratios which indicate the
net effect of each covariate on the dependent variable after controlling for all other
covariates. The reference (omitted) category of each covariate has a value of one and the
values for other categories are compared to that of the reference category. An odds ratio
greater than one indicates that women in that respective category have a higher chance of
giving birth (stopping or delaying childbearing) compared to women in the reference
category, and vice versa (DeMaris, 1992; Lee and Forthofer, 2006).
5.3 Dependent variables
This study uses the variables "birth in last five years" for actual fertility behaviour and
"desire for children" for fertility intentions and preferences to construct the dependent
variables. First, with regard to birth occurrence in the last five years regardless of parity,
that is, whether or not a woman experienced a live birth during the immediate five years
before the survey, two measures; the odds of having birth (in last 5 years) and the odds of
not having birth fin last 5 years) were formulated. Both indicators were coded '0' for a
negative response and '1' for a positive response. The former refers to women who have
begun childbearing (with at least one child) and the latter pertains to all women aged 15-49.
Both investigations on timing of recent births and fertility intentions are needed since they
complement each other in giving an overall representation of reproductive behaviour.
According to Agadjanian and Prata (2002), fertility intentions can be used as an
approximate gauge of future fertility, especially if such intentions are prevalent.
In the second part of this analysis, fertility intentions indicate whether or not a
woman intends to space or stop childbearing. The responses for 'birth stopping' (whether
or not a woman wants no more children) were scored into a binary form with a positive
answer coded '1' for yes (wants no more) while a negative answer (wants) or those who
were undecided were coded '0' for no. Only a small proportion of respondents gave an
uncertain response, and women who were sterilised or declared infecund were excluded.
Birth spacing' was coded '1' for a positive response (wants later) and '0' for a negative












The correlates/independent variables have been identified and considered based on their
established theoretical importance as set out in the previous chapters. The correlates used
include economic status, education, place and province of residence, age, age at first birth,
number of living children, employment status, modern contraceptive use and knowledge of
modern contraceptives. The main independent variable of interest is economic status
whereas the other variables are controls. The study focuses on economic status as one of
the vital components of the overall economic conditions and economic uncertainty. This
indicator of a woman's economic status is constructed from ownership of certain
household goods and characteristics as suggested by Schoumaker (2004) in Chapter 3.
5.5 Methodology of analysis of births occurrence and fertility preferences
Stata was used to find the estimates coefficients (A ) of the covariates using maximum-
likelihood estimation methods. The p-value was used to test the significance of the
coefficients in the model. A p-value less than 0.05 signifies that the coefficient is statistically
significant at the 5 per cent level in the model and vice versa.
The variables used in the analysis were first standardised for each DI IS for Zimbabwe
such that they have the same categories for comparative purposes. The relationship
between economic status and fertility behaviour can be complex. Since economic status is
the main factor of interest among socioeconomic factors, it is the variable used in the main-
effects model to assess the net effect (after controlling for other demographic and
socioeconomic factors mentioned earlier) on fertility (the odds of giving birth) and fertility
preferences. As socioeconomic variables (e.g., economic status and education) are closely
interrelated and influence fertility outcomes in a complex manner. Logistic regression (with
interaction effects) is used to assess the relative importance of these variables and to
determine the net effects of each variable and of the combined (gross) effects on fertility
outcomes in a given period or survey. The following interactions were considered;
economic status and education, economic status and residence, and education and age. The
results from analysis of interaction effects of economic status and other socioeconomic
variables on fertility and fertility preferences are presented in Appendix C. By controlling
for confounding variables, the net effect of economic status on fertility outcomes may










of economic status on fertility outcomes can be modified by education and hence the net
effect of education and economic status on fertility outcomes presents a picture of fertility
outcomes different from when there is no interaction between these two variables (i.e.,
main-effects model). In other words, one cannot easily predict fertility behaviour when
"wealth" (a measure of economic status) and investments in education among women are
increased simultaneously. The fertility outcomes would be controlled or determined by the
net effect of education and economic status and the relationship/interaction between these
two variables. This allows for direct comparison of economic status within educational
levels. That is, the influence of wealth on fertility (and fertility preferences) can be
examined for uneducated and educated women.
Separate logistic regression models were fitted to assess shifts in actual fertility and
fertility intentions. The models are applied to data on all women when modelling odds of
not having given birth in the last 5 years and all women with at least one child when
modelling birth occurrence in the last 5 years before each survey. The models were also
applied to data on women who have begun childbearing to determine their fertility
preferences and intentions: desire to space childbearing and desire to stop childbearing.
The same model used as the standard was applied separately to each ZDHS data to
examine periodic shifts or variations in actual fertility (occurrence of a birth) and fertility
preferences, and to assess whether or not population subgroups adjust differently over
time. This was done to compare coefficients from a fitted model for different periods using
the four ZDHS surveys. An assessment of how the coefficients (and odds) change has been
done using separate data sets since this has the merit of concentrating on recent fertility or
changes in fertility between different surveys instead of looking at cohort (or cumulative)
fertility trends.
After fitting logistic models with interaction effects, Tables  in Appendix C,
post estimation commands, for example, in Appendix C were run in Stata to predict the
gross and net effects on birth occurrence and desired fertility in each model mentioned
earlier for the variables of interest; economic status and education. The predict command
with the table, c() command gives the gross effects. Looking at the coefficients (for the
main- and interaction-effects) in each model gives net effects, which are calculated
manually, in Excel, using the ultimate means of all the independent variables. This allows











predicted values were taken to obtain the odds ratios for the net effects of economic status
(poorest, very poor, poor, richer, and richest) on fertility (and fertility preferences) across
educational levels (no education, primary, and secondary+). The adjusted odds ratios were
found by dividing each odds ratio for each economic status-education interaction term by
the odds ratio of the reference category; poor-secondary+. Thus point estimates for net
effects of economic status-education on fertility outcomes are obtained for each survey
data to determine the pattern of fertility. This is done since the overall (net) effect of
economic status on fertility is modified by its interaction with education.
5.6 Multivariate results on interaction between economic status and education
This section presents the adjusted/relative odds ratios (tabulated in Table 5.1-5.4) for the
variables of interest, that is, the net effect of a woman's economic status on fertility
outcomes across educational levels. Since adjusted odds ratios (adj. OR) were derived from
the odds ratios (OR) as stated above, hence the latter are not commented on. As emphasis
is on economic status ("wealth") variable, findings are discussed on the net effect of
economic status and education on the dependent variables. Other socioeconomic variables
have been used to develop the models or corroborate the findings, and are not discussed.
Thus only interaction effect tables in this section are shown and discussed. The findings are
presented in two sections: the first section presents results from the analysis on the odds of
giving birth, followed by analysis of fertility intentions (desire to limit/space childbearing).
5.6.1 Results of the multivariate analysis of births occurrence
The estimated adjusted/relative odds ratios of the net effects of economic status on having
given birth in the last five years across educational levels among women with at least one
child according to are presented in Table 5.1. The results represents fertility outcomes for
the periods 1983-1988 (economic growth/pre-crisis era), 1989-1994 (onset of economic
decline/early phase of economic reform), 1994-1999 (economic decline-onset of economic
crisis), 2000-2005 (severe economic crisis) which corresponds to the five years before the
1988, 1994, 1999, and 2005 surveys, respectively. The four time periods aim at capturing
the change in timing of birth events over time.
Table 5.1 shows the adjusted odds ratios relative to the secondary or higher-educated











decreases with economic status in the 1994, 1999 and 2005 surveys. In the 1988 survey, the
odds of having a child decreases with economic status among the educated women whereas
among the relationship between uneducated women and economic status is not clear. In all
the surveys the odds of having a given child are generally lowest among women with
secondary or higher education. The odds of having a given child are higher among primary-
educated than among uneducated women in the 1988, 1994 and 1999 surveys, but a
different (reverse) pattern is seen in the 2005 survey. This finding in the 2005 survey is
consistent with the results obtained in Figure 4.1 where fertility increased among the
uneducated and poorest women.
Table 5.2 shows the odds of not having given birth in last five years among all
women by net effects of economic status across educational levels. The odds are reported
relative to the poor and secondary or higher-educated women. In general, the odds of not
having given birth increases with economic status in all the surveys. The odds of not having
a child are generally highest among the secondary or higher-educated women in all the











increases with education, but in the 1994 and 1999 surveys the odds of not giving birth
among the primary-educated women are lower relative to uneducated women.
5.6.2 Results of the multivariate analysis of fertility intentions
In order to understand the pattern of fertility in addition to analysing explicit birth timing,
models for fertility decisions to delay or stop childbearing were also estimated. Caution
should be taken in interpreting fertility desires since they do not represent actual fertility,
but the likely course of fertility in the future or the reproductive environment at that
moment. Fertility intentions and preferences may not translate into practice as a result of
economic circumstances or over time. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present the odds of desiring to
stop childbearing and delay childbearing among women with at least one child, respectively.
5.6.2.1 Desire to limit childbearing
The adjusted odds ratios in Table 5.3 are presented relative to poor and secondary or
higher-educated women. The odds of wanting to stop childbearing (the desire not to have











in all the surveys. Among uneducated women the odds of desiring to limit births arc
highest among the very poor in the 1988 survey and richer in the 1994, 1999 and 2005
surveys. Among better educated women a positive relationship between economic status
and desire to limit childbearing is observed in all the surveys. The odds of wanting to stop
childbearing increases with economic status in the 2005 survey, but as for the other surveys
the relationship is inconclusive.
5.6.2.2 Desire to delay childbearing
Table 5.4 indicates that, overall, the odds of wanting to delay having children decreases
with economic status in all the surveys. The results especially from the 2005 survey are
instructive probably due to the large sample size used. Most notably, the poorer (i.e.,
poorest, very poor and poor) women are more likely to space having a child than the
rich/affluent (i.e., richer and richest) women. With respect to education, primary-educated
women are less likely to delay childbearing than better educated women in all the surveys,











5.7 Discussion and interpretation of results
It should be noted that the study also assesses if there are differences in fertility between
the pre-crisis periods and crisis periods, that is, how the point estimates in adjusted odds
ratios vary between the 1988 and the 2005 surveys. The odds of giving birth among women
who have begun childbearing increased in the 2005 survey relative to the 1988 survey on all
levels of economic status among uneducated and secondary or higher-educated women, but
decreased on all the levels of economic status among primary-educated women (Table 5.1).
Table 5.2 suggests that the odds of not giving birth increases by education and economic
status between the 1988 and 2005 survey except among the poorest and very poor
uneducated women amongst all women. This further confirms an overall declining trend in
fertility and that the uneducated poorest women have increased their fertility as found in
Figure 4.1. It should be noted that there is no a consistent pattern on how the point
estimates obtained in the study varies from one period of survey to the next. Although it is
difficult to establish a direct causal link between fertility and the severe economic crisis, the
data does not show conclusive evidence whether the crisis (as reflected by the 2005 survey)
has influenced fertility decline among population segments. With economic setbacks or











suggested by Agadjanian and Prata (2002), yet this is not consistent with the study findings.
Even if the lower standards of living could have encouraged change in reproductive
behaviour by lowering fertility choices, women's circumstances such as widowhood and
divorce are other factors which have an indirect negative bearing on fertility behaviour.
Thus no single factor may be necessary and sufficient for explaining the fertility decline
process.
The second part of the multivariate analysis has dealt with fertility intentions and
preferences for the limitation of childbearing and the spacing of childbearing. The pattern
obtained from desired fertility tells only part of the story, since a clear pattern of
childbearing is not obvious as found in actual fertility and preferences may change with the
passage of time. Overall, the odds of educated women to limit childbearing are higher
relative to uneducated women in all the surveys (Table 5.3). However, with respect to
women desiring to space childbearing, it is difficult to discern an apparent pattern of
childbearing, although it is noticeable that the secondary or higher-educated women are
more likely than primary-educated to space their childbearing in all the surveys, except in
the 2005 survey where the poorer primary-educated women are likely to space childbearing
than the poorer secondary or higher-educated women.
The ratio of the odds of wanting to space childbearing (in Table 5.4) to the
corresponding odds of desiring to stop childbearing (in Table 5.3) provides an overall
picture of fertility preferences and intentions among women with children. If the ratio is
greater than one this implies women are more likely to space than stop childbearing.
Among uneducated women the poorer (low-economic status women) are more likely to
space than to stop childbearing in all the surveys. Among the rich/affluent (high-economic
status women), the same pattern is observed in the 1994 survey, but the findings from the
1988 and 1999 surveys are inconclusive. In the 1994 survey, the rich are more likely to
space than to stop childbearing whereas a decade later (2005 survey) the opposite is
observed. Among primary-educated women both the rich and poorer are more likely to
stop childbearing than to delay childbearing in all the surveys, except in the 2005 survey
where the poorer appear to be spacing rather than limiting births. Among the secondary or
higher-educated women the pattern is complex to analyse. The rich are likely to limit
childbearing in all the surveys except in the 1999 survey where the results are inconclusive.











survey they are likely to space their births, and the results from the 1988 survey are not
conclusive. The analyses presented above suggest that educated poorer women are likely to
change their fertility behaviour over time. The educated rich women are consistent and
better able to control their fertility in all the periods than the uneducated women. This
finding is similarly echoed by Potts and Marks (2001) that if education enhances a woman's
status her bargaining power in controlling family size may improve due to, amongst other












The purpose of this study has been to examine socioeconomic differentials in fertility in
Zimbabwe over time using the 1988, 1994, 1999 and 2005 ZDHS surveys. The
socioeconomic factors; rural-urban residence, education and economic status were selected
for the study. Before explaining fertility differentials it is important to highlight fertility at
national level and overall data quality.
Overall fertility in Zimbabwe has declined over the period of study. As measured by
cohort-period fertility rates (CPFRs) fertility has declined from 6.7 to 3.8 children per
woman between 1980 and 2005. That is an average drop of about 3 births per woman in
two and half decades resulting mainly from an increase in modern contraceptive use over
time. The median age at marriage is low at age 19 and has not changed over time.
By applying CPFRs and projected parity progression ratios (Pjs) in addition to the
conventional total fertility rate (TFR), the nature of fertility decline, robustness of methods
used and data quality were determined using the four ZDHS surveys. The CPFRs estimates
from the four surveys suggest omission of births occurred among the oldest women aged
45-49, especially among uneducated women. It is difficult to correct for recall errors bias,
although this is not a major drawback in this study. It is noteworthy to observe that the
study found close coincidence and consistency in the estimates of Pjs in all the surveys,
which may suggest the birth history data may be of overall good quality, despite the
omission of births in earlier time periods among older women. Hence the Brass-Juarez
method used in the analysis is robust and not affected by the timing of birth events in the
family building process. Further, the estimates derived from Pjs and CPFRs substantiate
each other on the finding that fertility began to fall faster in the early 1980s or among
women born in the mid 1960s (Figure 4.9 and Table 4.7). The pattern is observed for all
the four data sets used in the analyses. It has been observed that fertility began to decline as
result of a drop in high parities and has been rapid before 1990 and slowed since 1990.
This study reveals what has been driving overall fertility over time in Zimbabwe is not
uniform among population subgroups. With respect to recent data from the 1999 and 2005
surveys, at face value, overall fertility appears to have stalled in Zimbabwe in recent years.











patterns of fertility behaviour; modern contraceptive use, fertility preferences and
timing/occurrence of births or in-depth analysis of birth histories. High fertility among the
poorest women with no education is offset by much lower fertility among the richest
women with secondary or higher education. On the whole, an ongoing fertility decline
among all parities and cohorts has been observed in all the surveys.
The CPFRs and Pjs show that fertility began to decline in urban areas in the 1970s
and then followed later in the early 1980s in rural areas. Urban women consistently have
lower fertility than rural women. Between 1980 and 2005, the fertility rate estimates show
that rural fertility has declined almost in parallel to rural fertility with a difference of about 2
births per woman in all the periods, and hence the rate of fertility decline was almost the
same. In the period urban fertility dropped by 49 per cent from 5.1 to 2.6 children per
woman whereas rural fertility dropped by 38 per cent from 7.4 to 4.6 children per woman.
The age pattern of fertility decline is similar between the rural and urban areas with the
peak of childbearing occurring among women aged 20-24, in all the surveys. The
proportions of rural women who proceed to a subsequent birth are higher than those of
urban women. In both urban and rural areas fertility decline accelerated in the 1980s then
slowed after 1990. Although fertility decline slowed down in the post-1990 period, the use
of modern contraceptives increased rapidly in both urban and rural areas in the same
period with the former having higher contraceptive uptake than the latter. While in the pre-
1990 era contraceptive use had a strong depressing effect on fertility, the post-1990 era
indicates the effect of contraception on fertility might have been lower. Median age at
marriage is low both in rural and urban areas. Overall, urban women are married at age 19
whereas rural women are married one year earlier.
The results indicate that fertility is inversely related to the level of education. Between
1980 and 2005 fertility has fallen from 8.2 to 5.8, 6.9 to 4.5, and 4.1 to 3.2 children per
woman among women with no education, primary education and secondary or higher
education, respectively. In the period of concern fertility has fallen most both among
uneducated and primary-educated women by about 2.4 children per woman. A much more
rapid fertility decline occurred among uneducated and primary-educated women prior to
1990. The Pjs show that fertility decline occurred earlier for better educated women











Uneducated women are more likely to shift their fertility behaviour than are educated
women. Perhaps uneducated women's fertility has shifted more because it was higher to
start with. The age pattern of fertility in the four surveys is similar among the educated
women but different in each respective survey among uneducated women aged 30 and
below. Between 1987 and 1993 fertility has fallen much more rapidly among uneducated
women and then increased between 1998 and 2005. This shows indeed that the period TFR
may be affected by shifts in timing of births since the CPFRs show a gradual fertility
decline over time across all the levels of education. In addition the CPFRs reveal that the
differences in fertility according to the level of education have narrowed over time. This
finding sheds some light on the dynamics of reproductive changes that could have been
widespread among the uneducated in recent times as a result of the diffusion of birth
control technology or that family planning has strengthened over time.
Educated women are more likely to use modern contraceptives than women with no
formal education. Between 1987 and 2005 the proportion of uneducated women in union
using modern contraceptives has changed only a little whereas among educated women
contraceptive use has increased substantially. Although differences are slight, educated
women tend to marry later than uneducated women. Overall the median age at marriage
among secondary or higher-educated women, primary-educated women and uneducated
women has been found to be 17, 18 and 19 years, respectively, in all the surveys. Fducation
among women might have brought about knowledge of health care and birth control,
economic ambitions and realisations of personal needs which have a negative effect on
fertility.
Rural (urban) residence and low (high) levels of education are associated with low-
(high-) economic status. Fertility differentials by economic status exist. At extreme
economic status segments, fertility is lowest amongst the richest women and highest
amongst the poorest women in all the surveys. Affluent/high-economic status (i.e., the
richest and richer) women have lower fertility than low-economic status (i.e., the poorest,
very poor and poor) women in all the survey periods. Overall, the period TFR shows that
there is a negative relationship between economic status and fertility. There are only
marginal differences in the age at marriage across the levels of economic status, but marked
differences in the use of modern contraceptives might have resulted in the fertility











use with economic status exists. With the exception of an anomaly among the richest class,
across all the levels of economic status modem contraceptive use has increased over time.
Further analysis of the effects of economic status on fertility outcomes was
conducted using multivariate analysis controlling for various socioeconomic and
demographic variables. The study looked at the overall (net) effects of economic status and
education on fertility and fertility preferences: having or not having given birth in the last
five years before each survey and the desire to delay or stop childbearing. Overall, there is
a negative relationship between economic status and having given birth among women who
have had at least one child. Better educated women have the lowest odds of giving birth.
This pattern of fertility behaviour is consistent in all the survey periods or over time.
Among all women, the odds of giving (not giving) birth decreases (mcreases) with increase
in wealth. Analysis of fertility preferences and intentions show some, although moderate,
differences. Notably the odds of desiring to limit childbearing are lower among uneducated
women relative to educated women in all the surveys. In general, the odds of desiring to
delay childbearing decreases with economic status in all the surveys. On the whole, fertility
control across economic strata has not yet spread equally over lime.
One should be careful not to over-interpret the results based on self reported fertility
preferences and intentions since they may be biased due to rationalization and may not
necessarily correlate with actual fertility behaviour. Further, there may be a thin line in
separating the differences between long-term and short-term reproductive future
expectations especially for women at lower parities.
The other limitation of the study is that the subject matter on the relationship
between economic status and fertility outcomes has not received much attention in sub-
Saharan Africa. Aggravating the situation is the fact that there are different quantifications
and definitions amongst researchers which therefore make comparisons within countries
and across countries difficult. Due to this conceptualisation problem, it is therefore
necessary to undertake studies which refine on the methodologies or standardise measures
to facilitate comparisons using the DHS data. If different measures of economic status
were employed, although this is not the focus of this study, this would have determined if
the same/different conclusions would be drawn. In addition, this study only looks at the
impact of economic status on fertility (and fertility preferences) and does not take into











Measurement of fertility disaggregated by the urban-rural variable is prone to bias as
mentioned earlier since women may change residence and report events in the place they
did not occur. However, the variable is important for programme intervention and policy
making. It is recommended that future studies should incorporate migration in the process
of determining fertility. One coping strategy toward a crisis is migration and therefore it has
consequences for fertility since temporary spousal separation or even divorces may occur.
Further inquiry may be needed to compare the fertility of women native to both urban and
rural areas with that for migrants. It should be noted, however, that due to the cross-
sectional nature of DI IS data (since it measures events at one point in time) one cannot
precisely track compositional changes of women over time in terms of their migration,
residence, economic status, education amongst other important socioeconomic status
variables partly because status can be changed anytime. This problem cannot be easily
resolved since there is lack of longitudinal data or time-varying socioeconomic data in
developing countries, and in Zimbabwe in particular. Collection of detailed migration
histories, however, would not be cost effective as the objective of DHS surveys is to
minimise the costs of collecting data.
AIDS does have some effect on fertility, although, limited DHS data used in the
study does not permit an inquiry of fertility outcomes among infected and non-infected
women. Further, change in economic settings may lead to, or vary with, fertility changes.
The substantial protracted economic decline since 1999 in Zimbabwe may lead one to
assume that the crisis had an impact on fertility and that it may have disproportionately
increased the economic status gap among women. To draw conclusions on the effect of the
crisis on fertility in Zimbabwe would be premature since the crisis is still ongoing. It would
be of huge importance to use DHS dataset(s) post the crisis era to evaluate its effects on
fertility. From the analysis in this study, the fertility rates declined almost proportionally
across all in the surveys and there are no signs of a pronounced trend or deviations of
fertility outcomes, even by socioeconomic subgroups. Hence there is not enough evidence
to accept or refute the crisis-led fertility transition debate in Zimbabwe.
The study standardises the variables across the four ZDHS data sets and then fits the
same model to each dataset for comparative purposes, therefore, the analysis does not
intend to fit a 'best model' for each data set. It would be useful to fit a model for each











modelling and how these factors differ from those used in the study. It would be useful to
conduct similar research in countries with different levels of fertility transition; early or later
stage of fertility transition.
Despite the limitations mentioned above, this study shows that measures of
socioeconomic status are linked to fertility behaviour; contraceptive use, parity progression,
fertility as measured by TFR or timing of births/birth occurrence in regressions and these
fertility measures corroborate each other in the analyses/findings. In other words,
socioeconomic variables used in this study play an important role in defining a woman's
fertility behaviour. It can be concluded that fertility has declined in all economic status
levels, educational groups and urban-rural residential categories, and a negative relationship
between these socioeconomic variables and fertility is observed in all the surveys. In other
words, uneducated, low-economic status and rural women have larger families whereas
educated, high-economic status and urban women have small families. The negative
relationship between economic status and fertility is observed even after controlling for
various socioeconomic variables. The net effects results show that fertility decreases with
rising wealth as well as with education in all the surveys. The urban-rural residence
differences in fertility seem to have remained constant over time whereas that between
educational levels has reduced over time. Contraceptive use clearly is a more significant
factor than age at marriage in explaining fertility differentials by socioeconomic factors
(urban-rural residence, education and economic status) in Zimbabwe. Indeed contraceptive
use is negatively related to socioeconomic variables whereas with median age at marriage
the differences among the various categories of socioeconomic variables are only marginal.
Fertility decline in Zimbabwe has occurred among all age groups and birth orders,
especially among higher birth orders in recent years. In addition, the poorest lag behind in
controlling their fertility as compared to the richest and hence leading to growing
differences in fertility among population subgroups. Perhaps the high fertility among the
poorest is a rational response to hardships or insecurity and hence insurance and
replacement strategies may explain the benefits of large families among the poorest as
suggested by Schoemaker (2004).
Overall, fertility differentials by socioeconomic factors (economic status, measure of
wealth, and education) tend to remain. An increase in wealth and education among women











and education among women have a continued importance in shaping levels and trends in
fertility. Despite the continued differentials in fertility, policy makers and planners should
continue to ensure on increasing modern contraception and that it is affordable, accessible
and used efficiently to the whole population. This would in the short-term or long-term
reduce the unmet need for contraception/family planning. With regard to the static age of
marriage, empowerment of women through improving on education, employment/labour-
force participation and other mechanisms would motivate women in increasing their age of
marriage thereby lowering fertility. Economic status was found to be a good predictor of
fertility behaviour since the same negative relationship in the total fertility rates is found in
multivariate analyses and that the differentials in fertility persist after the effects of
education, rural-urban residence and other variables were controlled for. This suggests that
the effect of economic status "wealth" goes beyond the effects of level of education and
rural-urban residence on fertility behaviour. This study, altogether, adds to the body of
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